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Coalition Command And Control: Essential Considerations

A Monograph
by
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Armor



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
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
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ABSTRACT

COALITION COMMAND AND CONTROL: ESSENTIAL
CONSIDERATIONS by MAJ Joseph A. Moore, USA, 43
pages.

This monograph examines the command and control structure available to coalition land commanders. The intent of the monograph is to identify essential considerations that should be met to choose a particular command structure. For example, why was a parallel command structure used in DESERT STORM and what factors were key to that decision. The expectation is that there are lessons to be derived from our coalition experiences that may be useful in future coalitions.

FM 100-8 Combined Army Operations (Draft) identifies three fundamental structures: integrated, parallel, and lead nation. Historically, the US Army has experienced each structure. This monograph will examine the US-British integrated command during World War II; the US-led lead nation structure in the Korean War, 1950-1952, and during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991; and the parallel structure used during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991. The monograph will analyze each structure using six factors identified in the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations (Final Draft): national goals and objectives, equipment, military doctrine and training, personalities of leaders, cultural diversity, and language. FM 100-5 describes these factors as considerations for selecting a coalition command structure.

This monograph concludes that only two of FM 100-5's factors should be considered essential considerations. National goals and objectives is the most important consideration and must be considered prior to establishing any command structure. Equipment, and more importantly, the supplies to sustain that equipment, is another essential consideration. One addition should be made to FM 100-5's list, and that is time. Time available to establish a command structure and initiate military activities will significantly influence the choice of command structure.

Table of Contents

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Doctrinal Analysis	3
III. Historical Analysis	10
World War II	11
Korean War	18
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT	24
Persian Gulf War	32
IV. Conclusions	39
V. Doctrinal Implications	43
Endnotes	47
Bibliography	54

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Introduction

We may find ourselves...acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies, but nations with whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic or military cooperation.¹

Since the ancient Greeks wars have seldom been limited to two belligerents. Rather they often required the resources of two or more states to overcome common opponent(s). Coalitions are common in western history from Thucydides' ancient account of the Spartan led coalition against the Athenians during the Greek Peloponnesian War to the many coalitions arrayed against Napoleonic France. The modern era has not lessened the need for allies to overcome one's enemies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact provided examples of long-term alliances, while the French-British-Israeli effort in 1956 to retake the Suez from Egypt is an example of an extremely short-term coalition to achieve mutual interests.

Coalition and alliance warfare has been a common experience in American military history as well. From the days of Yorktown to our most recent experience in the Persian Gulf, the US military has fought most of its wars with allies. Recent US experience tends to be with formal long-term alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Korea. These alliances share a long history of successful cooperation toward a common objective and an integrated multinational command structure headed by an American for employing their forces. Unified commanders employing forces within these alliances can expect relatively mature command structures, procedures, and doctrine for the employment of their forces. Meanwhile, operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT

STORM reintroduced military leaders to the challenges of ad hoc coalitions.

Coalitions differ from alliances in that they are based on informal agreements to accomplish a common action.² They are often ad hoc, formed in response to a crisis, and tend to transition to an alliance if the objective is not immediately attainable (as in Korea) or dissolves upon attaining a focused, short-term objective (as in DESERT STORM). Recent operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey, DESERT STORM in Saudi Arabia, and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia are examples of ad hoc coalitions forming to accomplish a common action. These operations reflect former President Bush's statement above from the 1992 National Security Strategy in that they are ad hoc coalitions containing both traditional and non-traditional allies.

Historically, the US has developed its coalition warfighting methods through trial and error.³ However, sufficient time has always been available to work out issues. Of particular importance, COL Hixson noted in his study of many of America's coalitions, is that essential coalition command relationships be solved prior to combined forces entering combat.⁴ In most historical cases coalitions had months to develop command arrangements because it took that long to get their forces into combat. However, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the potential for force employment within days of the formation of the coalition. Therefore, it is imperative that the command and control arrangements made at the outset be functional.

This monograph will analyze three coalition command structures, described in the US Army's newly drafted FM 100-8 Combined Army Operations in an effort to determine what

criteria are essential to support a particular command structure. The manual describes three fundamental command structures available to the unified commander: integrated, parallel, and lead nation. Within each structure are options concerning the integration of the staffs, the makeup of subordinate formations, and functional or area orientation of different coalition member forces. At issue is whether there is a methodology for determining the proper command structure among the various choices available to the commander.

Given a variety of command structures available to lead a coalition force, how does a unified commander in chief (CINC) choose the proper structure for his land forces in a future conflict? What information does the commander require in order to facilitate his decision. The first place to look is our doctrine for coalition warfare.

Doctrinal Analysis

While the US military has an extensive history as a member of a coalition, its doctrine in this area is not very well developed. One indication of this is the lack of doctrinal literature on the subject. The list of Department of Defense (DOD) joint publications fails to list a single manual on the subject. The most comprehensive joint doctrine for combined operations consists of nine pages in the test publication, JCS Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. The Army has only recently acknowledged the problem by adding a manual on combined operations to its lists of doctrinal manuals. Additionally, FM 100-5 Operations (1993 Final Draft), the Army's keystone manual, now includes a chapter on combined operations.

This monograph will analyze three primary doctrinal publications: test JCS Pub 3-0, the final draft of FM 100-5, and FM 100-8 Combined Army Operations (Preliminary Draft). JCS Pub 3-0 and FM 100-5 provide a descriptive doctrine to guide commanders and their staffs in the field, while FM 100-8 attempts to present a prescriptive solution for combined army operations. Much of the analysis in this section will focus on the methods offered by FM 100-8 in light of the considerations presented in the other two manuals beginning with the overarching joint doctrine.

JCS Pub 3-0 does not describe the organizational options available to a commander in chief (CINC) except to say that he "may choose to organize on an area or functional basis, or a combination of the two."⁵ Additionally, JCS Pub 3-0 fails to address the details of coalition command organization beyond the selection of an area or functional organization, possibly because it presumes a structure and command relationships similar to the US military's joint command relationships. The manual's advice to the CINC regarding command arrangements is to use those command relationships described for joint forces, while maintaining national integrity whenever possible.⁶ What then are the joint command options.

JCS Pub 3-0 reflects the changes in joint operations caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This act established the CINC as the operational authority within his theater. Goldwater-Nichols established combatant command authority (COCOM) for the CINC. COCOM gives the CINC full authority to command forces in his theater.⁷ He commonly places his joint forces under the operational control (OPCON), or tactical control (TACON) of subordinate leaders. OPCON gives the commander the ability to assign tasks,

designate objectives, and organize and employ the forces designated as OPCON to his command.⁸ TACON of forces gives the commander the ability to provide detailed, and usually local tactical direction of forces to accomplish an assigned task.⁹ Of the two, TACON represents less control over a force than OPCON. Neither has the power that full command provides to service components in joint operations or a single nation commands in combined operations. As an example, only full command provides the authority to replace leaders. Within these basic command relationships the CINC can tailor his US joint forces in service or multi-service commands.

A single service command, commonly referred to as a component command, consists of forces from only one service and can be an area or functionally oriented command. Multi-service commands choices include; joint task forces (JTF), sub-unified commands, and functional commands.¹⁰ JTF's and sub-unified commands operate within an area, with JTF's considered a temporary arrangement and sub-unified commands more permanent. Functional commands may have forces of one or more services, but are oriented on a function, such as air operations, rather than any single geographic area.¹¹ Based on the JCS Pub. 3-0 description of joint commands, the CINC could organize his combined forces nationally, as a combined task force (CTF), as a sub-unified command, functionally, or by national or multinational service components. Each of these organizations could control an area or a function as required.

Functional organizations place all forces of a type, air forces for example, under the control of a nation. This would be analogous to a joint force land component commander (JFLCC), but for combined land forces instead. Functional

commands are useful when there is a need for centralized control of functional forces whose operations are not limited to specific areas.¹²

The CINC selects his theater's command structure "based on the operational situation, the complexity of the mission, and the degree of control needed to ensure that the strategic intent is satisfied."¹³ This advice suggests the CINC address command and control considerations by examining operational considerations and not the political agendas of coalition members. JCS Pub 3-0 provides a list of considerations for the CINC to use when developing his command structure including the political and economic cohesion of the nations within the coalition.¹⁴ However, the manual fails to expand on this theme. Instead, it quickly moves to organizational considerations such as: capability of national forces to ensure they receive tasks commensurate with their equipment and capabilities, the need for liaisons, the preference for national forces as opposed to multinational forces, and the general rule that the nation with the most forces in a functional command should control the function if it has the capability of command and control.¹⁵ These considerations provide little beyond simple rules to follow and continue the trend for thinking operationally when determining coalition command structures.

LTG (R) John E. Cushman noted the fallacy of thinking of coalition commands as multinational joint commands. In his study of Command and Control of Theater Forces: Issues in the Mideast Coalition Command LTG Cushman identifies numerous shades of command relationships within a coalition. LTG Cushman noted that seldom will a CINC achieve anything close to the level of COCOM authority that Goldwater-Nichols gives the CINC for US forces and seldom will he receive true

OPCON of coalition forces.¹⁶ Instead, he will always contend with the ally's right to refuse or ignore unpleasant orders if it does not coincide with his national objectives.¹⁷ The Goldwater-Nichols Act resolved this problem by clearly defining the CINC's authority over US joint forces, but coalition partners are not bound by similar rules.

Within US Army doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations offers two organizational solutions, applicable to both area and functional organizations. The manual suggests combined staffs if the members of the coalition members "are very similar in culture, doctrine, training, and equipment, or if extensive experience exists in working with the involved nations".¹⁸ FM 100-5 describes an indirect approach using an auxiliary staff to translate the orders developed by the planning staff when operating with dissimilar nations.¹⁹ These two approaches use a concept of fluid verses direct drive to describe the differences in organizational approach.²⁰

In mechanical devices direct drive is useful when both the input and output can handle the stress of a direct linkage. In a coalition if the culture, doctrine, training and equipment of the allies are very similar they may be able to handle the stress of working together directly in an integrated command, for example.²¹ Such allies do not need a device that eases the strain of working closely together, while less similar allies may be overwhelmed by such close working relationships.

The torque converter is a fluid drive device that mechanically reduces stress as the power of an engine is transferred to the transmission. Fluid drive in a coalition may be necessary if cultural diversity exists, or the allies

possess fundamentally different doctrines, equipment, and training. A mechanism must be established to absorb the stress such diversity may cause. FM 100-5 describes an auxiliary staff responsible for translating the planning staff's instructions for other coalition members and thereby reducing the friction between diverse forces.²² Of particular interest to this monograph are the factors used to determine which type of drive to employ.

FM 100-5 notes that the factors of national goals and objectives, military doctrine and training, equipment, cultural differences, language, and the personalities of the coalition's commanders influence the selection of a command and control structure.²³ These factors provide a method to analyze historical coalition command and control structures.

National goals and objectives reflect the political agenda each nation brings to the coalition. Alliances and coalitions are "first and foremost a political coalition" with each nation's contribution dependent on its political agenda.²⁴ Carl von Clausewitz in On War, his classic work on military theory, identified the political solidarity of alliances as a possible center of gravity.²⁵ One reason for this was his observation that a "country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own."²⁶ Unifying the effort of the coalition is the primary task of any command structure and it must withstand the stress of the changing situations common to any conflict.

The military doctrine and training of the forces from various coalition states are seldom identical. An early assessment of each nation's capability is necessary to properly employ them in support of the coalition's goals. The commander may have to adjust his force composition to

take advantage of the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the coalition's forces.²⁷

Equipment limitations within coalition members can seriously restrict their employment.²⁸ Combined forces may have similar equipment or its equipment may be more similar to the enemy's. The coalition's equipment may represent a mix of high-technology with lesser systems. The grouping of compatible systems is a consideration to limit fratricide and reduce logistical and operational difficulties.²⁹

Cultural differences result from differences in language, values, religion, and economic and social conditions.³⁰ The military forces of the coalition members can be expected to reflect their national and ethnic culture. These cultural differences may be minor or serious when considering command structure. Simple solutions such as demonstrating sensitivity to another's culture may preclude problems. But, some coalitions may find it difficult to transcend the cultural diversity without a fluid drive mechanism discussed above. There is often a link between language and cultural differences, but common language does not always indicate a common culture, witness the old Yugoslavia in 1993.

Language represents a significant challenge in operating with other non-English speaking nations. Language differences slow communication of orders, instructions, and coordination.³¹ It requires an investment in time and human resources. Language trained liaisons must also be operationally competent. Lacking language trained liaisons may limit the tactical cooperation of coalition forces and should be considered in developing a command structure.

The personalities of senior leaders within the coalition are critical to the building of mutual trust,

understanding, and reliance.³² If a subordinate is from another nation, his cooperation will often require persuasion rather than direct authority.³³ Commanders must gain the trust of all the allied leaders to function within a coalition. Failure to achieve a working relationship may destroy a fragile coalition or require new command arrangements.

FM 100-5 provides a list of considerations for developing coalition command structures, but it fails to explicitly outline possible command arrangements. FM 100-8 Combined Army Operations provides a more complete set of options for organizing the combined command, as one might expect from a manual dedicated to the subject. FM 100-8 lists three command structures: integrated, parallel, and lead nation. An integrated command, commonly referred to as a combined command, has a single, common multinational headquarters to direct the overall effort.³⁴ The integration of multinational commanders and staffs may continue to the "lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission".³⁵ A parallel structure uses two or more separate command organizations without a single common headquarters to control coalition forces. In a lead nation command a single nation in the coalition provides the commander in chief and his principle subordinate commanders for the entire coalition.³⁶ The US military has had recent experience with all three command options.

Historical Analysis

History provides numerous examples of coalitions and alliances at work. This monograph will analyze only coalitions that actually engaged in combat to meet their common objectives. Therefore, alliances such as NATO and

the CFC in Korea will not be analyzed. Analysis of World War II will seek to determine essential considerations for the selection of an integrated command structure for the British and Americans. Analysis of the lead nation command structure in Korea, from 1950-1953, and analysis of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's Combined Task Force-Provide Comfort (CTF-PC) and Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) will determine essential factors for this structure. Finally, analysis of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM will determine the reasons for choosing a parallel command structure to control the coalition's land forces.

World War II

Throughout World War II the allies represented a continually changing coalition of nations. However, the command structures for the numerous operational level theaters remained relatively constant after early 1942. In unilateral theaters, such as the Soviet's eastern front or the American central Pacific theater, there was a single nation command. The other allies rarely influenced these theaters, other than agreements on resources and objectives developed during the infrequent conferences between Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt.³⁷ Other theaters, such as the American led southwest Pacific, were dominated by one member of the coalition. The integrated US and British command structure of the European, Mediterranean, and southeast Asia theaters represents the last time the US fought a war as part of an integrated command. NATO, CFC,

and other standing alliances have used this model, but have yet to fight a war.

Almost immediately after America's entry into World War II, the concept of integrating the British and American efforts became a reality. As military historian Hew Strachen observed:

The theme of integration, between nations, between services, and between the individual arms of those services, is a characteristic of the allied war effort...integration was not achieved without deep political struggles in the command structure, but the staff organization remained sufficiently resilient to cope...³⁸

The initial situation in December 1941 supported the political decision to integrate the efforts of the two allies. Britain was necessary to the coalition because of its resources, its geographical position adjacent the continent of Europe, and its military forces which had the burden of combat until America could mobilize its manpower and resources. Meanwhile, the US represented nearly unlimited potential for resources and would provide the majority of the manpower once mobilized.³⁹ No other nation at the time could match the importance of the British geographical location and combat forces or America's potential. Therefore, the smaller coalition members were not invited to join the integrated command except as subordinate formations.

The US-British system of integrated command evolved throughout 1942 and 1943. The eventual integrated command structure had one overall commander from the nation with the most forces in the theater. The commander's deputy was normally from the other nation. Subordinate formation

commands alternated between nations until reaching a level of a single-nation force. The staff was composed of officers from both nations and all services. While selection of commanders was often determined by their nationality, selection of staff officers was based on merit, without regard to their nationality.⁴⁰

The landings in North Africa in 1942 were the first attempt to use the integrated command structure and it exposed some critical weaknesses. The most notable weakness was the lack of service integration between the two allies. For example, the land forces had their own national commander, each reporting to the combined commander, General Eisenhower. At Casablanca, later in 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff integrated air, land, and naval forces under General Eisenhower. This solved the command problem, but an organization made up of officers from the three services of two nations requires time to achieve proficiency.

To illustrate the problem of a newly integrated staff consider in 1943 an American, General Eisenhower, commanding in the Mediterranean. The British supplied his deputy, and the commanders of the ground, air and naval forces. The two armies, one British and one American, were commanded by General's Montgomery and Patton respectively.⁴¹ Integrated staffs supported General Eisenhower and his land, air and sea commanders. The US and British services provided officers to man all posts in the staff with little regard for their nationality. For example, the chief of staff for one commander might be an American, while another had a British officer as chief of staff. Few members of the various integrated staffs were assigned prior to planning the invasion of Sicily.

The Sicily invasion illustrated the complexities of a combined command. The planning for the invasion lacked coordination between the integrated headquarters. For example, the combined fleet supporting the invasion engaged British and American aircraft bringing American airborne troops to Sicily, of which they were uninformed.⁴² Historian Carlo D'Este attributes the difficulties to the extremely decentralized planning of the various headquarters elements and bloated bureaucracies within each of the headquarters.⁴³ The difficulties the allies experienced may also be attributed to the inexperience of the leaders in combined operations.

A key characteristic of an integrated command structure is the time necessary to form and mature into a fully functional military formation. From the 1942 decision to integrate commands prior to the North Africa landings to the development of the fully functional supreme allied headquarters in Europe in 1944 was over two years. The experience gained from the combined operations during 1942 and 1943 improved allied interoperability. General Eisenhower noted that North Africa landings demonstrated the need for integration of allied services, while Sicily demonstrated the need to coordinate the effort of the various integrated service staffs to support an operation.⁴⁴ Each operation improved the effectiveness of the integrated command structure, but not without personality conflicts among the senior leaders.

Both General's Eisenhower and Devers noted the impact of personalities among senior coalition leaders in World War II. General Eisenhower addressed the personality issue to an audience at the National War College in 1948. He described one basic ingredient as essential in all allied

commands, that being mutual confidence between the allies. Mutual confidence was necessary between individuals, from the senior political leaders to the military chiefs of the allied nations.⁴⁵ Leader personalities could influence the establishment of mutual confidence within the coalition.

General Devers, as deputy supreme allied commander in the Mediterranean for the 1944 invasion of southern France, noted the impact of personalities more directly. He stated after the war that the most common and most important problem a combined commander faces is the "personalities of the senior commanders of each of the armed services of the allied powers under [his] command...".⁴⁶ He, like Eisenhower noted the difficulties of resorting to relief of another nation's commander.⁴⁷ Devers solution to the problem was to gain harmony among subordinates through persuasion.⁴⁸ Personality conflicts may hamper the successful integration of the coalition's effort. The friction between individual commanders within the integrated command proved a source of continual difficulties for the allies. The Patton and Montgomery conflict was widely publicized in the press, both during and after the war. Leader personalities are important to the maintenance of the command structure, but there is no evidence to support a conclusion that personalities were a consideration when developing the command structure. The integrated command structure was determined long before the selection of leaders and long before personality conflicts were identified. The integrated command structure was also determined before all the coalition's members were known.

By 1944 the European and Mediterranean theaters included subordinate formations from numerous other allies. They ranged from a Polish airborne brigade to a French army.

The commonwealth countries of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India generally placed their divisions under British command. Each of these nations formed a national headquarters to command their forces in theater, but none of these nations were represented in the integrated command and staff structure. Instead they provided liaisons to assist in the integration of their units into army operations.⁴⁹

General Eisenhower defended the decision to preclude other allies from his integrated staff by reason of equipment and supplies. He argued that the US and British provided most of the equipment and supplies to form the smaller allied formations while the smaller allies only provided the men which was sufficient reason for the US and Britain to deny them membership in the command structure.⁵⁰ General Eisenhower's argument highlights the importance of equipment and supply in the command arrangements of World War II.

During World War II, the national commanders were responsible for the logistics of their national formations. However, there were only two substantial sources of supplies for the allies, the US and Britain. As General Julian Thompson describes in Lifblood of War, "The Americans would exercise the prerogative of those who pay the piper, they would also call the tune".⁵¹ In this case, he is referring to the American domination of resources by 1944. The national commanders found they did not control the resources, but were instead at the mercy of those who did.

Political considerations often dominated operational considerations when selecting a coalition's command structure. For example, China refused to allow General Stillwell or his replacement, to command her forces in the field even after he demonstrated considerable success

commanding Chinese forces in Burma.⁵² The internal political environment of the generalissimo's army meant that subordinate commanders would not accept Chiang Kai-shek's civilian authority if he abdicated military command.⁵³ The generalissimo's internal political situation required that he and his Chinese supporters command all Chinese forces in China.

In another example of the importance of political considerations, Australian military and civilian leaders argued to little effect for more representation in MacArthur's southwest Pacific theater in 1942. The Australians provided the majority of MacArthur's operational ground forces and most of the bases for US air and naval forces. However, the US was not willing to allow anyone to influence its Pacific policy, during or after the war. Therefore, the US did not share command with the Australians in the southwest Pacific theater.⁵⁴ As in China, a purely political objective determined the command structure for a theater of war.

In summary, the lessons derived from the integrated command in World War II were fourfold. First, the importance of establishing mutual confidence among the senior leaders in the coalition was paramount to the maintenance of the integrated command structure. The personalities of the theater's various commanders had to be in harmony for the command structure to function effectively. Second, the coalition required time to work out the mechanics of an integrated command and staff, taking two years to become fully functional. Third, the political agendas of the US and Britain influenced the command structure of some theaters such as the US refusal to allow the Australians to join MacArthur's staff. Fourth, the

influence of material resources on the command structure should not be minimized. General Eisenhower acknowledged the importance of resources when denying French access to the command structure. While American access to the southeast Asia command structure was due to the British dependence on American equipment and supplies to sustain their forces.⁵⁵ The source of equipment and supplies became a key consideration in membership in the allied command structure.

The Korean War

The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 provides an example of a lead nation method of command in war. In Korea, the US had the United Nations mandate to prosecute the war and on 7 July 1950, less than two weeks after the UN acted to assist South Korea, General MacArthur's Far East Command was given the responsibility for prosecuting the UN's mandate. Within a week the South Korean President placed all his forces under the command of General MacArthur. In addition to the South Koreans, MacArthur also requested allied assistance to defeat the Communist attack.

General MacArthur had four specific requirements for coalition forces supporting the UN effort. First, they were to be small enough to integrate into US divisions and regiments, at least a reinforced battalion and not larger than a brigade. Second, their infantry weapons and artillery must fire standard US caliber ammunition. Third, they were to bring sufficient support units to allow

immediate employment. Lastly, English was to be the command's operating language, therefore each unit should deploy with English linguists for liaison with their parent American formation.⁵⁶ Eighteen nations answered General MacArthur's call by providing small military contingents and accepted US leadership of all coalition forces.

To the US, Korea represented a very different scenario than World War II. In World War II Great Britain was an equal partner due to its geographical location, resources and combat forces. In Korea, there was no other nation that could offer the US similar assistance. The war was fought on Korean soil, but Korea was unable to rearm its military without US supplies. The US would have to bear the burden of combat due to the small allied contribution and the poor condition of the South Korean military. By July 1951, a year into the war, the US contingent to Korea represented over 70% of all the forces committed to the war effort.⁵⁷

Almost immediately after receiving the UN mandate, the joint chiefs of staff decided to utilize an existing command, MacArthur's Far East Command, to command the coalition's effort. The allied nations did not seriously attempt to adjust the lead nation structure beyond the national command contingents each deployed into theater.⁵⁸

As stated previously, the US, the Republic of Korea, and eighteen allied nations fought the war, but only the US manned the staffs of 8th (US) Army and the UN Command. All

of the allies and their national headquarters were integrated into US divisions and regiments. Eventually, every US division in Korea would have at least one allied battalion, and some had more than one.⁵⁹ This policy would severely test tactical interoperability.

Language, equipment, doctrine and training compatibility for these units was solved by one of two mechanisms. First, General MacArthur requested specific types of forces and English interpreters to insure allied forces could rapidly integrate into US formations. Second, the US provided nearly all classes of supply to the UN contingents. However, not all of the allied contingents met General MacArthur's requirements.

The arrival of two very different allied units within weeks of General MacArthur's request established the magnitude of 8th (US) Army's challenge. The British 27th Brigade arrived combat ready and was committed immediately upon arrival. However, the arrival of a poorly prepared Philippine battalion proved a bitter experience for everyone concerned.⁶⁰ 8th (US) Army discovered they must develop a procedure for determining the state of a unit's readiness, equipment, and training before attaching the unit to an American formation. This organization became known as the United Nations reception center (UNRC).

The UNRC proved invaluable preparing national units for integration into American divisions. The UNRC assessed the

arriving units training and equipment condition and developed a tailored program to prepare each unit. To get units to a standard near that of its parent US formation, the UNRC trained each unit on their newly acquired US equipment. Language difficulties were identified and often solved while in the reception center. However, US divisions were often left to resolve language and training problems themselves as units were forced from the UNRC due to the political environment.⁶¹

The UNRC, however, did not have much success modifying the national military doctrines of the allied forces. The French commander did not believe in the US use of artillery fires in the attack and refused to attack at night. The Turks proved reliable defenders, but disliked reconnaissance. The British doctrine for defence placed positions on the high ground, while American's preferred the lower slopes.⁶² All of these problems were significant tactically, but had little impact on the command organization. The solution for the American staffs was to consider national differences during tactical planning. This allowed each national contingent to contribute in a manner that best supported their tactical doctrines.

Korean forces represented an unusual situation for US military leadership. Korean units were placed under the direct command of the 8th (US) Army rather than the operational control common to the other allies.

Additionally, Koreans were used as replacements in most US combat units.⁶³ The integration of Korean soldiers and units into US formations was not prevented by the cultural diversity of the two allies.

US direct command of Korean forces represented an exception to the policy of operational control of allied forces by US commanders established as far back as World War I. This exception is a unique feature of the Korean War with US officers commanding foreign forces in combat. The cultural and language differences presented challenges to the American command, but did not preclude the utilization of forces in combat.⁶⁴ Generally, the use of culturally diverse allies caused some innovation at the tactical level, but failed to hamper the command structure.

In summary, Korea represented a US-dominated command structure built around a standing US headquarters. While the Korean military, the commonwealth countries, and other allies were integrated somewhat differently, each was required to fight the American way of war due to the American dominated command structure.⁶⁵ American officers manned the staffs and commanded multinational formations of allied forces.

The UNRC demonstrated the effectiveness of receiving, equipping, and training diverse allied units to operate within the American method of war. By equipping foreign units with American weapons, uniforms, and vehicles, the US

solved most logistical interoperability problems. Language and training became the two remaining issues to resolve.

The US military's lack of trained linguists placed the burden of the language problem on the allies. To minimize the problem, units of similar cultural and language backgrounds were grouped together.⁶⁶ For example, the Philipino battalion was initially attached to the Puerto Rican 65th regimental combat team to ease language and cultural problems. While the language and cultural problems were significant to tactical commanders, it never influenced the command structure.

Integration of small units in US formations placed a significant burden on the American divisions. After the war, studies determined the most efficient allied units were of division size, since their robust support structure gives them some self-sufficiency. Brigades and regiments were also considered fairly efficient for the same reasons. The smaller units, such as companies and battalions, required significant support from its parent organization and were marginally effective militarily.⁶⁷ Small military formations may present a dilemma for any future lead nation command structure with coalition members who provide small military contingents. Political realities may require the presence of these small units regardless of their operational utility.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The 1991 peace enforcement experience to assist the Kurds provided another variation on the Korean model of lead nation command organization. The U.S. led a coalition effort on behalf of the UN as they did in Korea in 1950. However, this operation had its own unique characteristics that are of particular interest today.

First, it was a humanitarian operation. While combat was possible, it was not the primary objective of the coalition. As a humanitarian operation, numerous civilian agencies were authorized to support operation PROVIDE COMFORT further complicating the command structure. Second, the coalition's command structure built upon a unilateral US command structure that was operating in the area. Third, coalition units began arriving within hours or days of accepting membership in the coalition, rather than months or years as in Korea and World War II. The expectation was for these units to be employed immediately upon arrival, without the benefit of a reception center. Last, the majority of the coalition members were also NATO alliance members. Unlike World War II and Korea, this coalition had the benefit of members who had years of experience working together politically and militarily.

On 5 April, 1991 operation PROVIDE COMFORT began as an unilateral effort by the US to provide aid to the displaced Kurds in Turkey. General Gavin, as the CINC for European

Command (EUCOM), was responsible for US forces in the theater. He designated a joint task force JTF-PROVIDE COMFORT (JTF-PC) commanded by Air Force MG Jamerson to coordinate the American relief effort. Earlier the same year, he commanded JTF-PROVEN FORCE operating from Turkey in support of operations in Iraq. MG Jamerson's command structure for JTF-PC was essentially the same structure used during operation DESERT STORM. Both joint task forces relied upon US Air Forces, Europe and BG Potter's special forces command for officers to man the headquarters.⁶⁸ MG Jamerson organized the airlift of supplies while BG Potter had the mission to go into the refugee camps to assist the Kurds on the ground.⁶⁹ For nearly two weeks JTF-PROVIDE COMFORT provided relief to the Kurds in Turkey.

Meanwhile, by 12 April, 1991 President Bush's political efforts had successfully established a coalition of mostly European nations to assist the effort to the Kurds. The coalition soon swelled to 13 nations providing forces and 30 nations providing supplies. Within two weeks, military forces from the coalition's nations began operations throughout Turkey.

General Gavin remained in charge of the overall coalition effort as it transitioned to a combined operation. He formed a combined task force under LTG Shalikashvili from elements of the EUCOM staff and many of its subordinate American commands. Initially, this staff was an ad hoc

organization of all the US services built around the staff MG Jamerson and BG Potter had already deployed to Turkey.⁷⁰ MG Jamerson remained as LTG Shalikashvili's deputy and BG Potter assumed command of JTF-A with the mission to continue support to the Kurds with his special operations forces.⁷¹ By late April, the much larger CTF had expanded upon the command structure of JTF-PC to accommodate the expanded mission and forces of the coalition.

As they arrived, other nations agreed to participate in the CTF staff, something not done in Korea. For example, the British provided a senior officer to serve as the operations officer for the CTF and numerous junior officers served throughout the headquarters. Other nations provided junior officers and liaisons to the CTF staff.⁷² The US commanded all major multinational subordinate formations within the CTF, including two JTF's, a multinational support command, and a multinational civil affairs command. According to FM 100-8, this is a lead nation command structure with an integrated, multinational staff.⁷³

Differing political agendas of the various coalition members became an issue almost immediately. As in Korea and World War II, outside the CTF chain of command were the commanders of the various national contingents. Each national contingent was led by a national commander who commanded the forces, provided administration and logistical support, and represented his government within the

coalition.⁷⁴ Each of the national commanders was responsible for maintaining the political agenda of his nation.

The national commanders reviewed CTF operations orders before they were issued to insure the orders complied with the respective nation's political agenda. The national governments were then informed and either approved the plan or requested changes prior to their forces executing the plan.⁷⁵ This level of political involvement in daily military affairs is indicative of the modern era with its near instantaneous telecommunications.

National rules of engagement (ROE) became another method of identifying a nation's political objectives. The non-US contingents did not deploy with heavy weapons in what they viewed as a humanitarian operation.⁷⁶ Combat operations were not expected beyond local protection and self defense. Additionally, the French version of the ROE included a limitation on providing assistance to other national contingents if engaged in combat. French units were only to come to the aid of individuals, not units.⁷⁷ Only after national level negotiations were their ROE's modified to reflect the essence of the US ROE. This change in ROE was necessary to allow JTF-B to organize and lead a combined force into Iraq to secure the Kurdish home area.

Subordinate to the CTF were numerous US-led multinational commands. Each of these had a US commander

and a staff of US officers. Coalition nations placed their units TACON to the US commander of the multinational commander.⁷⁸ JTF-B's makeup was particularly varied and will be the example for this monograph.

JTF-B had brigade sized units from the US, France, Italy, Spain and Britain. The JTF also had smaller combat and support units from three other nations. JTF-B's mission was to move into Iraq and establish security for the eventual return of the Kurdish refugees to their homes.⁷⁹ The JTF had a combat mission within the overall humanitarian mission of the CTF. How it organized for the operation is illustrative of the complexities of coalition command.

The staff for JTF-B was strictly American. Officers from the US Army's V Corps and the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) comprised the majority of the JTF-B staff.⁸⁰ Each of the eight nations providing forces to JTF-B maintained liaisons with the JTF staff. JTF-B organized its zone into five sectors, one each to the US, British, French, Spanish, and Italian brigade-sized contingents. An initial analysis revealed, however, that none of the national contingents were self-sufficient. For example, the French were without artillery, anti-tank weapons, medical support, and reconnaissance units.⁸¹ JTF-B realized it was necessary to task organize its subordinate national forces into multinational formations to operate effectively once in

Iraq. First, however, the command problem required resolution.

Command relationships were clearly understood by all coalition members down to the JTF level, but the multinational command relationships of tactical formations had not been considered prior to deployment. Unlike Korea, the US had no major tactical units in which to integrate smaller coalition formations. Command arrangements within the multinational formations proved difficult. The French refused to work for the British at any level and only after consultation with their government would they accept US operational control of their forces. In return they demanded operational control over other national contingents.¹² Eventually, the French government accepted US TACON of its brigade in return for US, Italian, Spanish, and British units being placed subordinate to the French brigade. This solution satisfied the political and military concerns of the JTF-B commander.¹³

The command structure the JTF devised was to create sectors controlled by each of the brigade sized contingents: the US, UK, French, Italian, and Spanish.¹⁴ Within each national sector were numerous smaller multinational units to provide the forces lacking in purely national commands. The French sector provides a particularly illustrative example.

As previously noted, the French brigade lacked heavy weapons and other critical elements to operate in a austere,

hostile zone for an extended period. JTF-B therefore gave the French control of US antitank platoons, Italian special forces units, US civil affairs and military police units, Spanish and Belgium medical units, and access to US and British artillery and air support. The US Marine Corps' Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) teams provided the French brigade access to US air support, attack helicopters, and UK artillery. The ANGLICO also performed the liaison for the JTF to the French throughout the operation.⁴⁵ The French force structure was typical of JTF-B's subordinate formations.⁴⁶

Given the multinational nature of the average tactical formation it is surprising that language, cultural differences, and doctrine did not appear to affect the command structure of the coalition to any degree. The coalition's success in this area may have been due to the multinational experience of the coalition partners in NATO.⁴⁷ The common NATO experience may improve the effectiveness of multinational formations in future coalitions containing NATO members.

Personalities played a critical role to the successful maintenance of the coalition's command structure. According to COL Goff, operations officer for JTF-B, the coalition's military leaders found that "most of the decisions made during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT were not covered by national policy or guidance".⁴⁸ He further states that the

coalition's success was based on the military leaders "professionalism and personal relationships with other coalition military leaders".⁹ The active support of the national contingent commanders expedited the resolution of many conflicts within the coalition. For example, the British commander's support was critical to the British acceptance of their artillery supporting JTF-B in Iraq.⁹⁰ While personalities were instrumental in the success of the coalition's command structure, they played no part in the selection of a lead nation command structure.

Time is a consideration not discussed in FM 100-5, but during PROVIDE COMFORT, time proved to be a key consideration in the selection of a command structure for the coalition. Time was a major factor in not integrating the JTF-B headquarters. COL Goff noted, "The pace of operations did not allow for the training necessary to integrate coalition officers into US staff operations at the tactical level."⁹¹ The similarity in structure of MG Jamerson's JTF-PROVIDE COMFORT and CTF-PROVIDE COMFORT would also indicate that the lack of time forced the coalition to assume a structure similar to one already in place.

In summary, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the importance of national objectives and equipment differences in defining the coalition's command structure. In addition, time was an essential factor in the selection of a lead nation structure built around the in-place JTF. The need

for the military leadership to develop mutual trust was reaffirmed as essential to the maintenance of the coalition command structure.

The Gulf War

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought together the largest coalition of nations (49) since World War II.² Allied participation in Korea and Vietnam never numbered more than 60,000 soldiers, and often much less. In contrast, the coalition of nations arrayed against Iraq numbered in excess of 700,000, with over 160,000 non-US troops involved in the ground war alone.³ Eventually thirty-six nations provided ground, air and naval forces to the coalition's effort while the remainder supported the coalition in other ways.⁴ The development of a working command structure for such a large and diverse coalition proved complex.

During operation DESERT STORM the coalition operated under one of two commands, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) or the Saudi Joint Forces Command. There was no single unifying headquarters for all coalition forces. Generally, Muslim countries served under Saudi control while the US's more traditional allies were under CENTCOM control.⁵

Political considerations required a parallel command structure. As the initial deployment to Saudi Arabia began, the Saudis initially agreed to the US retaining full command

of US forces if they had "strategic direction".⁹⁸ Strategic direction was never really defined, but came to mean that the Saudi's would provide general strategic guidance, but not command US forces.⁹⁹ The US was not offered, nor desired, control of any Muslim country's forces. Instead, the Saudis offered all Muslim nations the opportunity to participate in the coalition if they placed their forces under Saudi control.¹⁰⁰

The decision to form a parallel command structure was a political one between the US Secretary of State and the Saudi King.¹⁰¹ GEN Schwarzkopf describes the command arrangement as one of joint command, between himself and LTG Khalid, but with the US commander as the final approval authority for offensive plans.¹⁰² This command arrangement satisfied the political realities while taking advantage of the American experience in large offensive operations.

France presented a third parallel command initially. During the defensive phase of DESERT SHIELD, the French wanted a separate sector to defend and did not wish to be included in any other country's command structure.¹⁰³ After the Saudis balked, the French agreed to coordinate their activities with the Saudi military command while retaining command and control of their forces.

France's separate command structure worked reasonably well during the relatively static defensive phase. The shift, however, to offensive operations required extensive

tactical coordination between tactical forces. The French insistence on a parallel command structure prevented their inclusion in any allied formation. Within France there were significant political debates over whether France should participate in offensive operations. It was not until December 1990 that France informed General Schwarzkopf of their willingness to participate. Concern for the light equipment in the French division caused the French to request they not participate in the main attack, instead they were willing to accept US TACON of their forces if they were used to protect the northern flank.¹⁰² This is an example of a national political decision influencing the command structure. Fortunately, the French demand to guard the northern flank was just the thing Schwarzkopf required for his operational plan.¹⁰³

The British retained command, but placed their forces OPCON to CENTCOM. This arrangement was determined prior to their employment in theater.¹⁰⁴ This political decision, while limiting the number of separate commands in theater, also limited their operational employment to sectors controlled by US commanders. During the defensive phase, the British provided an armored force to Lieutenant General Boomer's MARCENT sector. For the offensive phase, the British political objectives influenced the employment of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division. LTG Sir Peter de la Billiere made it clear to General Schwarzkopf that the

British must participate in the main attack rather than the Marine's supporting attack.¹⁰⁵ This led to a major shift in the command arrangements of the Marine and Army components to meet the British objective.

The coalition's unique feature was the coalition coordination, communication and integration center (C³IC) to coordinate and transmit information between the two headquarters. The C³IC performed the daily coordination and integration of effort within the coalition. This cell proved essential to the functioning of the command structure and maintaining the unity of effort within the coalition.¹⁰⁶ The coordination center kept factors such as language, training, equipment, and doctrine from hampering the coalition's command structure.¹⁰⁷

In terms of language proficiency, the US has come a long way since Korea, 1950. Language training within the military solved many of the problems encountered in Korea. In 1950, the US could not provide liaisons with the necessary language skills and required each coalition contingent to provide English linguists. In DESERT STORM, the US supplied language trained liaison teams to its coalition partners down to battalion level to speed coordination and provide the allies access to American fire support.¹⁰⁸

DESERT STORM represented one of the most culturally diverse coalitions in American experience. The contrasts

between the Muslim and western culture could have hampered the coalition's efforts, yet it did not. A significant reason was the personality of the leaders involved and their sensitivity to the political and cultural realities of the coalition.

The cultural differences were much deeper than the language barrier. General Schwarzkopf describes Saudi Arabia as "a xenophobic kingdom fiercely devoted to keeping itself religiously and culturally pure".¹⁰⁹ Only the grave threat posed by Iraq could overcome the inhibitions of the Saudis to westerners in their country.¹¹⁰ It became one of Schwarzkopf's primary responsibilities to solve intercultural problems before they proved divisive to the coalition.¹¹¹

It is difficult to determine the relative impact of cultural diversity on the parallel command structure. Certainly the command structure reflected the political considerations of Saudi Arabia, the US, and the western allies.¹¹² However, General Schwarzkopf acknowledged the political consequences of cultural differences. The deployment of westerners to Saudi Arabia provided Iraq a political tool in the Middle East.¹¹³ Defense Secretary Cheney stated in his report to Congress on the Persian Gulf War:

This task [of managing the complex relationships]... was particularly difficult given the great cultural differences and political sensitivities among the Coalition partners. The problem was solved by an innovative command arrangement involving parallel international commands...¹⁴

This coalition, with its culturally diverse members, seems to support the fluid drive model of the FM 100-5 authors. Cultural differences transformed what seemed to western soldiers minor transgressions into major problems requiring solutions from the highest levels. Additionally, the use of the coordination center to translate American plans, coordinate the deployment, and to resolve a multitude of daily issues fits the FM 100-5 auxiliary staff model for coalitions made up of diverse partners. The cultural diversity between the Muslim members of the coalition and their western allies may have been an essential consideration when the US and Saudi leaders determined the command structure.

Personality played a key role in the success of this coalition. Secretary Cheney credits much of the success of the coalition to General Schwarzkopf's deft handling of the relations of the various forces in the coalition.¹⁵ Schwarzkopf's autobiography of the war includes numerous examples of his personal interventions to achieve harmony within the coalition.¹⁶ Even the Saudi military leadership's acceptance of the command structure required Schwarzkopf's personal assurance before they supported the proposal.¹⁷ Political and cultural factors drove the selection of a parallel command structure, but its success was due to the personal relationships established by the senior leaders of the coalition.

As in World War II, time was required to develop the coordination necessary for the parallel command structure to achieve unity of effort. DOD's report to Congress highlighted the need for time to develop the coalition. The C3IC greatly improved coordination, but it needed time to gain experience in its operation.¹¹⁸ For example, coalition forces began arriving in theater in August, 1990, to assist the Saudi's defense. However, a final plan for the defense of the kingdom, translated by the C3IC and approved by both the US and Saudi leadership, was not issued until 29 November 1990.¹¹⁹ Throughout the fall of 1990, CENTCOM and the Saudi command refined plans and trained forces which built mutual trust between the non-traditional allies.¹²⁰ The command structure accurately reflected the political realities of the coalition and had the time necessary to resolve coordination issues between the two commands.

In summary, DESERT STORM demonstrated the essential role of political factors in determining a coalition command structure. In this particular case, cultural factors influenced the political considerations as well. DESERT STORM again demonstrated the important role of personalities in maintaining a coalition. Personalities were a not a factor in the choice of command structure, but they were necessary for its successful operation. Language, doctrine and training, and equipment did not significantly influence the command structure. This was due to the success of the coordination center and extensive liaison network established during the early days of the coalition. As in World War II, time was necessary to establish a fully functional command structure. The parallel structure, particularly between non-traditional allies, may be a political necessity, and it requires time to form.

Conclusions

No two nations will have aspirations so similar as to develop no conflicts of view. When the question of ways, means, and method arises... national aspirations and characteristics come to the foremost.¹²¹

Political considerations dominate command arrangements in a coalition. While a military commander might think that operational concerns should determine the best command organization, historically the political agendas of the member nations have influenced the process. Early in 1942, Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt divided the world into three geographical spheres based on their post war political objectives. The two allies shared command by integrating the command structure in those theaters where there were mutual interests. In areas where the domain of one was paramount, such as America in the Pacific and England in India, one nation assumed unilateral command. The other allies were not invited to share in the integrated command structure even though their military contribution was significant in some theaters.

DESERT STORM provides another example of how political demands influence command organization. The parallel structure between CENTCOM and Joint Forces Command was a political necessity in DESERT SHIELD. The Saudi's political position in the Arab world demanded a separate chain of command to avoid any appearance of subordination to the US.

PROVIDE COMFORT also demonstrated political influence reaching down to the lowest tactical levels. JTF-B could not form and function until the coalition's leadership could agree upon tactical command relationships. Fortunately, the tactical concerns of the coalition's military leaders in

Turkey convinced the political leaders to adjust the command relationships. Mutual trust among the coalition's military leaders eased many difficult political issues in a complex and changing scenario.

National goal and objectives are not the only essential considerations for a command structure. Resources can influence the command structure. General Eisenhower defended the decision to prevent French integration in the US-British command in Europe. The French fielded large ground formations only because the US and Britain were the sources of their supplies and equipment. The presence of an American as deputy to Lord Mountbatten in the southeast Asia theater was not due to a large American force in the theater, rather it reflected the British dependence on American resources. In Korea, prompt, massive support was necessary to prevent defeat. Only the US had forces and equipment available to reinforce Korea quickly and only the US could continue to supply large forces as the war continued. As PROVIDE COMFORT and DESERT STORM demonstrated, the US has a unique military capability to sustain significant military power worldwide. The country that is a major source of equipment and supplies must be considered when developing the command organization.

Time is another essential consideration in establishing a command structure. World War II demonstrated that years are required to establish a fully functional integrated command structure. DESERT STORM's parallel structure required months to work out the coordination issues inherent in multiple command channels. Meanwhile, Korea and PROVIDE COMFORT illustrated the value of adopting a command structure already in place in fast moving, crisis situations.

Crisis situations may require the selection of a lead nation command structure if a coalition member has an existing headquarters available to control the coalition's forces. Korea and PROVIDE COMFORT provided examples of an existing national headquarters quickly transitioning to a coalition headquarters. An exception might be that coalition members draw on structure of an existing alliance. For example, it is conceivable that a NATO headquarters might be employed as quickly and effectively as a lead nation's headquarters. The challenge becomes a political one of gaining the alliance's support for the coalition's aim.

If time is available, then either an integrated or parallel structure is possible. An integrated command needs time to establish functional working relationships between multinational commanders and their staffs. A parallel command structure requires time to work out the necessary coordination to maintain unity of effort.

The other factors described in FM 100-5 are not essential considerations when determining a coalition command structure. Personalities, language, culture, and military doctrine and training are important planning considerations after a coalition command is formed, but they have little impact on the decision to select a particular structure.

Personalities are important, but not in the determination of the command structure. The maintenance of any command structure will depend to a large degree upon the abilities of the senior national and military leaders to work together. However, there is no historical evidence of a particular structure being considered based on the personality of the individuals involved. However, every

historical example identified the importance of personality to the successful operation of the command structure.

Cultural differences are not normally an essential factor in the selection of a command structure. Cultural diversity may create political agendas within a coalition as it did in DESERT STORM. For example, Turkey, a Muslim nation, participated in the US-led coalition in Korea without causing a change in command structure. The command structure in Korea was not modified to handle the cultural diversity of another very different culture, Korean soldiers and units. DESERT STORM's political agendas were influenced by cultural differences within the coalition. In Saudi Arabia, huge western military formations were occupying large tracts of Saudi land, something never done before. The cultural invasion the western forces represented was a great political risk to the conservative Saudi government. The actual conflicts caused by cultural differences were minor and easily handled without regard to the command structure.

Language does not appear to be a. essential factor in the decision for a command structure. Overcoming language differences is integral to the successful functioning of whatever command structure chosen. Also, language problems have been moderated by the language training programs within the US military. The US Army is no longer dependant on its allies for language proficient officers. While language difficulties will probably continue at the tactical level, they should not influence the choice of command structure.

Differences in military doctrine and training has a significant influence on the tactical operation, but its impact on the command structure is minimal. PROVIDE COMFORT and DESERT STORM demonstrated that units with widely

different training levels can work toward a common goal if operational planning considers the differences. Korea demonstrated that differences in US tactical doctrine and that of the French, Turkish and British contingents caused only minor tactical problems. Neither doctrine nor training levels influence the choice of command structure sufficiently to make it an essential consideration. However, there is one other essential consideration not found in FM 100-5.

Doctrinal Implications

US doctrine for combined operations does not adequately address the significance of the political element within a coalition. JCS Pub 3-0 implies that operational considerations will drive command structures. Historically, this has seldom been true. Instead, political considerations often determine the command structure. Coalition commanders must operate within the political limits established by the coalition's political leadership. Occasionally, significant operational issues may influence the political leadership to change the structure, as the French did in the transition from DESERT SHIELD to DESERT STORM and the adjustments to their command relationships in PROVIDE COMFORT. However, JCS Pub 3-0 should include the political objectives of the coalition's members as a key consideration in determining a command structure.

FM 100-5 correctly identifies political goals and objectives and equipment limitations as considerations for the selection of a command structure. It fails, however, to expand equipment limitations to include the other resources necessary to project modern military power. General Julian

Thompson, commander of the British commando brigade in the Falklands noted in his study of logistics in war:

[Multinational force] commanders may command the troops, but they do not have under their hands the 'beans, bullets, and fuel', or the means of moving these commodities. Therefore they do not command the troops in the full sense of the word. They are commanders in name only.¹²²

General Thompson correctly identifies the problem of command without control over one's resources. The command structure must acknowledge the source of its sustainment to function effectively.

FM 100-5 places considerations such as language, military doctrine and training, cultural differences, and leader personality in the same category as the essential factors identified above. The other considerations listed in FM 100-5 are useful, not in considering a command structure, but in its implementation. These factors are necessary considerations in executing any of the command structures.

FM 100-5 should add time as a factor for the selection of command structures. Time is a necessary requirement of the parallel and integrated command structures. These command structures take time to form and develop into functional organizations. The lead nation structure can significantly reduce the time necessary to form a command, particularly if the lead nation can build upon a previously established headquarters.

FM 100-8 needs to refine the chapter on command structures. The manual attempts to prescribe particular structures based on the composition of the coalition. For example, if the force is multinational, then the commander's staff should also be multinational.¹²³ Historically, this has not been true. The French have yet to participate on

any staff with Americans, and yet they have fought under American control in every example used in this monograph. An integrated command is very difficult to form and should only be considered in response to a political requirement.

FM 100-8 also describes command structures changing over time. The initial coalition command structure is normally parallel and transitions to lead nation as the coalition matures.¹²⁴ The transition from one command structure to another has little historical evidence to support it. Rather, the historical examples illustrate COL Hixson's conclusion that the command structure selected before combat must remain the one used after combat starts. There were no changes in the fundamental command structure in any of the examples cited in this monograph. There were modifications in the tactical command relationships of some coalition forces, ie, the French placing their forces TACON to JTF-B in operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

Command of coalition forces is not a neat and simple line and block chart. COL Goff stated after PROVIDE COMFORT that "there is no one correct, cookie-cutter approach for developing the [coalition] command and control structure".¹²⁵ He also noted that the choice of command structure must answer the political objectives of its members and be capable of functioning.¹²⁶ In modern warfare, that means the command structure should acknowledge the importance of the coalition partner's political objectives and those coalition members providing the preponderance of equipment and supplies to the military forces. Without political consensus the coalition will collapse. Without the equipment and supplies to sustain the coalition's forces, military operations will founder. Lastly, the structure must acknowledge the factor of time available. Some

structures are more capable of performing their mission immediately, while other require months to establish. The challenge for future operational planners will be to correctly analyze both the political requirements and available resources and then design the most effective and acceptable command structure for a coalition.

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51. Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1991), 77-78.
52. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 348-378. Mr. Spector describes the strained relationships between Stillwell and Chaing Kai-shek even while having success in Burma while commanding Chinese troops. LTG Wedemeyer, Stillwell's replacement, experiences similar difficulties, though his tact in handling his Chinese and British allies improves the situation.
53. Joseph W. Stillwell, edited by Theodore White, Stillwell Papers, (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 315-349. This section represents the 1944 papers of GEN Stillwell. He describes in great detail the political complexities facing the generalissimo. The communists are gaining strength and his own supporters are behind him because he is the source of American supplies.
54. Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977), 227-232.
55. Thorne, 109-110.
56. John A. Hixson and Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Combined Operations in Peace and War, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 1982), 229.

57. Grey, 30.
58. Hixson and Cooling, 269.
59. Ibid, 235-240.
60. Ibid, 229-230.
61. Ibid, 232-234.
62. Hixson and Cooling, 242-243.
63. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1986), 111-112.
64. Appleman, 385-390.
65. Ibid, 30.
66. Hixson and Cooling, 268.
67. Ibid, 265.
68. John P. Cavanaugh, " OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT: A Model for Future NATO Operations", SAMS Monograph (Ft. Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 8.
69. Cavanaugh, 11-12.
70. Cavanaugh, 10-13.
71. Ibid, 12.
72. Goff, Donald G. 'Building Coalitions for Humanitarian Operations: OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT (Individual study project, US Army War College, 1992), 11. COL Goff provides a first hand account as the JTF-B J-3 operations officer during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.
73. FM 100-8, 2-15 through 2-20.
74. Ibid, 12.
75. Ibid, 17.
76. Cavanaugh, 17.
77. Ibid, 17.
78. Ibid, 12-13.

79. Cavanaugh, 15. COL Cavanaugh was a staff officer on the JTF-B staff.
80. Ibid, 16.
81. Goff, 22.
82. Ibid, 17.
83. Cavanaugh, 17.
84. Goff, 22.
85. Ibid, 22-24.
86. Ibid, 22-23.
87. Cavanaugh, 35-36. COL Cavanaugh, as a senior officer in JTF-B, concludes that NATO was the glue that held the coalition together. NATO provided a common set of standards, doctrine and interoperability to all the coalition's members.
88. Goff, 17.
89. Goff, 17.
90. Ibid, 20.
91. Goff, 16.
92. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 500. This large document summarizes the initial lessons and activities of the Gulf War. It was required by Congress in Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991.
93. Ibid, 500.
94. Ibid, 20.
95. Ibid, 44.
96. Ibid, 493.
97. Ibid, 493.
98. Ibid, 40.
99. Ibid, 493.

100. H Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 373.
101. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 492.
102. Schwarzkopf, 390.
103. Schwarzkopf, 390.
104. Watson, Bruce W. editor, Lessons of the Gulf War ((Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 26. Numerous authors, too numerous to list, assisted Mr. Watson in preparing the article on coalition lessons.
105. Schwarzkopf, 385-386.
106. The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 44.
107. Ibid, 44.
108. The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 493-500.
109. Schwarzkopf, 305.
110. Lessons from the Gulf War, 21.
111. Schwarzkopf, 329-339. GEN Schwarzkopf recounts numerous incidents intercultural incidents that were raised to his level by the Saudis. In the initial stages this apparently consumed considerable time until soldiers and leaders were educated on the need for sensitivity.
112. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 42.
113. Schwarzkopf, 305.
114. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, xxv. From Mr. Cheney's introductory overview in the report to Congress.
115. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, xxv.
116. Schwarzkopf, see page 396-397 for an illustration of the Islamic-Christian problem and his personal involvement. 332-338 describes in detail the close nature of his relationship with LTG Kraliv and its relationship to solving the problems of two diverse cultures in close proximity. The trust developing between GEN Powell and GEN Schwarzkopf is outlined on page 326.
117. Ibid, 374.
118. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 494.

119. Ibid, 42.

120. Ibid, 41-42. The report describes some of the detailed coordination required to develop this plan, much of it would have been unnecessary in a unilateral US force, or if a previous military relationship had been present between the allies.

121. Devers, 5.

122. Thompson, 295.

123. FM 100-8, 2-19. This page includes an example of the lead nation structure using a multinational staff to "allow the commander to draw upon the expertise of alliance partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience." This statement is fraught with danger and historically inaccurate. The decision to place a British officer as the operations officer for CTF-PROVIDE COMFORT did not make up for any lack in the American staff. Instead it answered the need to establish mutual trust and a political agenda.

124. Ibid, 2-14 through 2-18.

125. Goff, 26.

126. Ibid, 26.

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